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that he opposed. In the last forty years, there 
have been multiple perspectives on the First 
World War, ranging from anti-war films to 
those which the author brands as an “ab-
struse Habsburg nostalgia” (p. 247).
Marvin Benjamin Fried, Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during 
World War I. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, xviii + 294 p.
Jonathan E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg 
Serbia, 1914–1918. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
xii + 275 p.
Reviewed by Dušan Fundić*
This review considers two books that deal 
with the period of the First World War in 
the Balkans, one from the perspective of 
Austria-Hungary’s diplomatic service, the 
other from the perspective of its occupation 
troops. The book by Marvin Benjamin Fried 
devoted to Austro-Hungarian wartime di-
plomacy and decision-making process offers 
as its major conclusion that the Balkans held 
a superior place in the Monarchy’s foreign 
policy over, for example, the Russian and 
Italian fronts. The book by Jonathan Gumz 
explores the mindset of the Austro-Hun-
garian army, its code of conduct, and its im-
pact on the occupation policy in Habsburg-
governed Serbia 1915–1918, and seeks to 
identify the driving motives of the occupiers.
Fried organized his book in six chap-
ters preceded by an introduction and end-
ing with a conclusion. All chapters with the 
exception of the first, “War Aims and De-
cision-Making in Austria-Hungary”, follow 
a chronological pattern. He aims to demon-
strate that the Double Monarchy had vital 
political, economic and military interests in 
the Balkans, which resulted in its aggressive 
and expansionist policies. The book is pri-
marily an analysis of the development and 
changes of Austro-Hungarian war aims and 
the changing definition of acceptable peace 
conditions in the Balkans during the First 
World War. Fried calls attention to the fact 
that Austria-Hungary’s war aims were by 
no means more moderate than Germany’s; 
but rather, that it simply focused on differ-
ent parts of the continent. For the Habs-
burg ruling elite, the fronts against Russia 
and Italy were something of a distraction, 
although they were not completely uninter-
ested. One of their concerns was, for exam-
ple, the Polish question, but, in Fried’s view, 
such aims were of secondary importance.
Unlike its German ally, the Habsburg 
Foreign Ministry retained control over the 
country’s foreign policy. Fried shows that the 
Emperor and Apostolic King Franz Joseph 
played a rather insignificant role in decision 
making, which also goes for domestic public 
opinion, since it had no influence on policy 
shaping. 
The chronologically organized chapters 
cover the following time spans: July–De-
cember 1914, January–September 1915, 
October 1915 – June 1916, June 1916 – May 
1917, and May 1917 – November 1918. 
Each of them presents a period in which 
Austro-Hungarian foreign policy faced dif-
ferent challenges and was forced to take new 
solutions in consideration. The author’s ac-
count is thick with detail, based on various, 
primarily archival, sources for documenting 
the consistency in Austro-Hungarian war 
aims.
* Institute for Balkan Studies SASA
Balcanica XLVII (2016)376
Between July and December 1914 the 
Empire, just like the other powers, was self-
confident and acted on the assumption that 
the war would be short and victorious, and 
that its main result would be to teach the 
Serbs a harsh lesson. As far as the shaping 
of foreign policy and war aims is concerned, 
Fried underlines the impact of Hungarian 
pressure embodied in Prime Minister Istvan 
Tisza, which lasted until May 1917. In the 
Adriatic region, the notion of negative war 
aims prevailed, the chief goal being to pre-
vent the Italians from assuming control over 
both sides of the sea. Also, Berchtold and 
Tisza shared the view that it was necessary 
to defeat Serbia and diminish its influence 
in the region.
The next chapter of the book covering 
the period from the beginning of 1915 until 
September the same year is dominated by 
the portrait of Istvan Burian, new Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. Fried portrays him as an 
independent statesman with a mind of his 
own, not merely as Tisza’s exponent in the 
Ministry as he is usually depicted. Burian 
was fully committed to the realization of 
war aims in the Balkans but military defeats 
in Galicia and Serbia crippled his attempts. 
Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary came under 
intense pressure from its German ally to re-
define its aims in order to attract Bulgaria 
and Romania into the war on the side of the 
Central Powers. 
In the period from October 1915 to 
June 1916 the Danube Monarchy finally 
achieved victory in Serbia, although not 
alone but with the help of its German and 
Bulgarian allies. The Bulgarian government 
almost immediately increased their territo-
rial demands, which caused new complica-
tions to Austria-Hungary and its ambition 
to establish domination in the Balkans. Fol-
lowing the Bulgarian pressure and internal 
divisions that sprang from Tisza’s intention 
to establish Hungarian control over Serbia, 
Burian had to endure the conflict with Chief 
of the General Staff Conrad who had been 
insisting on the idea of the annexation of 
Montenegro and Albania. Burian, on the 
other hand, was more in favour of the crea-
tion of small but viable states which would 
be able to check Serbian and Bulgarian in-
fluence in the future, and assigned Albania 
the most important role in such a geopoliti-
cal vision. Fried concludes that Burian pur-
sued a Balkan-centric policy.
Under the new Emperor, Karl I, the new 
Foreign Minister, Count Ottokar Czernin, 
found himself in a difficult situation in the 
period of June 1916 to May 1917. Faced 
with the impossibility to pursue Burian’s 
aims, Czernin sought to find an acceptable 
peace option. After the dismissal of Conrad 
in February 1917 and Tizsa in May 1917, 
Czernin obtained almost complete control 
but was unable to pursue his new goals be-
cause he could not get Germany’s consent to 
consider peace. After the victory against Ro-
mania, his efforts only became more futile. 
The last chapter is a quite short overview of 
the last months of the Monarchy. The old 
war aims in the Balkans were overshadowed 
by the need to secure food supplies for the 
population and the army, and an honourable 
way to peace. Because of the complete lack 
of resources for waging war between May 
1917 and November 1918, Austria-Hun-
gary could not resist German political and 
military control. 
The book written by Marvin Benja-
min Fried is based on an extensive body of 
sources and literature. Apart from Austrian 
primary sources, Fried was able to read and 
use documents in Hungarian, which lends 
additional credibility to his interpretations 
of Tisza’s and Burian’s roles in Austro-Hun-
garian policies. The author advances an im-
portant thesis by treating Austria-Hungary 
as a great power which was an independent 
actor with ambitious aims and not merely a 
“weight” that Germany dragged behind it.
Jonathan E. Gumz organized his book 
into five chapters focused on the invasion of 
Serbia, the Austro-Hungarian occupation 
policy, including the organization and im-
plementation of the legal system in occupied 
Reviews 377
Serbia, the military view of the occupied 
country as a food source for the war effort, 
and guerrilla warfare.
One of the author’s chief goals was to 
examine the nature of violence committed 
by Austro-Hungarian troops. Gumz finds 
that “much of the Serb historiography is 
on the mark” when exploring “executions, 
atrocities against civilians, military law, and 
the banishment and internment of the Serb 
national consciousness or at minimum Serb 
independence”. On the other hand, he re-
interprets the motives for the occupation. 
Rather than seeing it as the “intentional war 
of annihilation”,1 Gumz idealizes the Habs-
burg Army and suggests that it was guided 
by traditional, conservative values. Their 
mission, in his view, was to reshape Serbia 
into a province of an idealized bureaucratic 
empire, essentially supranational and free of 
politics and the notion of democracy. The 
Serbian population was to be transformed 
from a people of “king killers” into civilized 
subjects.2 In line with this logic, Gumz 
concludes that the complete devastation of 
Serbia was prevented by the adherence to 
conservative international values for which 
the Empire went to war. This limited the 
scale of violation of international law, such 
as the bombardment of Belgrade undoubt-
edly was.
Gumz makes his assumptions clear 
in the first chapter, “Facing a Serb Levée 
en Masse: The Habsburg Army and War 
on Civilians in 1914”. In his view, it was 
the haunting fear of the so-called komita-
djis, special Serbian units trained for close 
combat and guerrilla tactics, that caused a 
1 As interpreted in Alan Kramer, The Dynam-
ics of Destruction. Culture and Mass Killing in 
the First World War (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007).
2 The author makes a factual mistake naming 
the Serbian king assassinated in 1903 Milan, 
instead of Alexander Obrenović. In addition 
to that the book has a considerable number of 
spelling errors in writing Serbian names.
harsh and brutal response of the Austro-
Hungarian troops. In this way, Gumz de-
nies that anti-Serbian sentiment harboured 
by Austrian elites was a driving force behind 
the committed crimes. According to Gumz, 
the crimes were intended as a punishment 
for the Serbs who acted against the rules of 
war as imagined by the Habsburg officers. 
It seems that the author here succumbs to 
the apparently still lingering influence of 
the fear of the Serbian “irregulars” that was 
widespread in the Austro-Hungarian army, 
and to the point that one may almost be led 
to believe that it was them who defeated the 
invaders, not the regular Serbian troops.
In the second chapter, “Eradicating Na-
tional Politics in Occupied Serbia”, Gumz 
examines the mentality of elites in the Aus-
tro-Hungarian army. The proclaimed goal 
to reshape Serbia, which was possible only 
by force, was set in motion after the occu-
pation. But was this really the policy of the 
“Army of 1848 in 1914” as Gumz defines it? 
The University of Belgrade was closed, the 
use of Cyrillic was officially banned and it 
was replaced by the Latin alphabet.3
As Guenther Kronnenbiter has re-
marked: “Wasn’t the Habsburg authorities’ 
policy in Serbia to denationalize the Serbs 
more than just a sign of the army’s tradi-
tional aversion to nationalism? To ban the 
Cyrillic alphabet in Serbia – and in Bosnia-
Herzegovina – and to use Croats as teachers 
in Serbian schools can be read as an indi-
cation that some nations were considered 
less of a threat to the empire’s and its army’s 
integrity than others. Was it really just an-
other example of the long-established divide 
et impera tactics the Habsburgs had used 
time and again? Or should it not be under-
stood as the Austro-Hungarian version of 
3 Milan Ristović, “Occupation during and after 
the War (South East Europe)”, in 1914–1918 – 
online. International Encyclopedia of the First 
World War, ed. by Ute Daniel et al., issued by 
Freie Universität, Berlin 2014-10-08. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.15463/ie1418.10481, 6.
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the quasi-colonial ‘ethnic engineering’ that 
Germany and Russia were tinkering with? 
To Germanize or – for that matter – to 
Magyarize Bosnia or occupied Serbia wasn’t 
a realistic option, but to strengthen the po-
sition of the Croats vis-à-vis the Serbs was 
something that could and would be done.”4
The chapters “Legal Severity, Interna-
tional Law, and the Tottering Empire in 
Occupied Serbia” and “Food as Salvation: 
Food Supply, the Monarchy, and Serbia, 
1916−1918” addresses two of the most im-
portant aspects of the occupation for the 
Army. Gumz’s central argument is that the 
main reason for the violence perpetrated by 
the military commanders was allegedlly the 
enforcement of law and order, and not the 
unhidden intention to destroy the Serbian 
population and to force him to accept de-
nationalization. In the chapter devoted to 
the question of food the author looks at the 
changing perspective of the military, which 
at first regarded Serbia as worthless, but by 
the end of the war came to the conclusion 
that it could be a source of food supplies for 
the war effort. Finally, the army blocked all 
attempts of civil authorities to use Serbia’s 
food production for other parts of the Mon-
archy where civilians needed it. As a conse-
quence, Serbian population was often on the 
edge of starvation.
 The fifth chapter, “A Levée en Masse Na-
tion No More? Guerrilla War in Habsburg 
Serbia”, contains possibly the weakest set of 
arguments in the book. Without using any 
Serbian or Bulgarian sources, the analysis 
is vague and incomplete. The fact that sig-
nificant Bulgarian forces were employed 
to crush the Toplica uprising (1917) is not 
taken into account at all, thus making the 
revolt look like a set of petty skirmishes. An 
illustrative example in this respect is that 
4 Guenther Kronenbitter, “The Resurrection 
and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 
1914–1918. By Jonathan E. Gumz. Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
2009”, War Today 9/3, 407–409.
of Lieutenant Kosta Milovanović Pećanac. 
He was sent to the region by the Serbian 
military at the end of September 1916 to 
organize a revolt in the Bulgarian zone of 
occupation once the Serbian army reached 
the city of Skoplje. But the rebellion came 
too early because of the Bulgarian plan to 
mobilize local men. After two months of 
fighting and some 25,000 victims the re-
bellion was crushed.5 Instead of presenting 
all these facts, Gumz depicts Pećanac as a 
lonely komitadji who sought to engage local 
Serbs to attack the Serbs employed in local 
administration.
In general, Gumz offers a solid portrayal 
of the Austro-Hungarian army and its mo-
tives, but does not delve enough into its ef-
fects on the ground, avoiding to tackle the 
main problems: large-scale persecutions, 
dicrimination, mass interment of civilians, 
including women and children, as well as 
systematic attempts to denationalize the 
whole population of occupied Serbia That 
is why the author’s arguments are stronger 
when he analyzes the Habsburg army’s pre-
conceived notions about Serbia before 1914 
than during the occupation. As a result, the 
occupied population is seen only through 
the eyes of their occupiers. 
5 Andrej Mitrović, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu 
(Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 20042), 347–348 
(English edition: Serbia’s  Great War, West La-
fayette: Purdue University Press, 2007).
